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Chances and constraints of welfare management in the German federal system   
 
  
Abstract 
  
The German welfare state is in crisis. Alarming long-term demographic trends, the still 
not fully digested consequences of German unification and the current economic 
downturn in much of the Eurozone have combined to create an urgent need for welfare 
reform. Yet the constitutional arrangements which govern the German political system, 
and well-entrenched political practice let any such reform process become a daunting 
challenge. Thus, the welfare crisis is also a crisis of German-style co-operative 
federalism. Current empirical evidence makes for uncomfortable reading, and triggers a 
debate on the nature of the German federation: have the two constitutional principles of 
federalism and establishing equal living conditions throughout the federation become 
mutually exclusive? However, as much of the welfare state is centred on the best 
utilization of scarce financial resources, it is debatable to what extent alterations in the 
functional distribution of welfare responsibilities among the territorial levels of 
government can be regarded as a solution for the current problems. The article 
concludes that in the search for long-term sustainability of the welfare state the 
territorial dimension is likely to remain a secondary issue. 
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Introduction 
 
Social welfare has been a core issue in the German political and economic system for 
several decades.  Its first stirrings go back to the Bismarck era, when compulsory 
sickness insurance was introduced and workers in certain branches of industry, e.g., 
miners, started to organise mutual social support schemes. The Weimar Republic, in its 
early, optimistic days after the revolution of 1918, strengthened this approach and 
developed a series of socially orientated organising principles for the economy, ranging 
from postulating social rights to formalising and systematising welfare measures 
throughout the country (Art. 151-165 WRV1). Noteworthy here, though, is that huge 
ambitions, such as the “right and the duty to work” (Art. 163 WRV) are counterbalanced 
by much less concrete descriptions of welfare rights (e.g., Art. 161 WRV), which 
effectively amounted to little more than declarations of intent (Boldt, 1987:57-58). 
Nevertheless, the resulting legislation, the Reichsversicherungsordnung (RVO), in its 
1924 version2, was a significant step forward in the development of a coherent social 
security system in Germany. Indeed, it was so advanced that certain sections of it are still 
in force.3 However, the end of the Weimar era, with its breakdown of the welfare system, 
and the resulting massive social unrest which contributed so significantly to Hitler’s rise 
to power, served as a clear indicator to the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) that one ignores or mishandles the social welfare issue at one’s peril.     
 Consequently, the welfare issue was a key constituent element of the post-war 
reconstruction. Even before the founding of the state in 1949, the debate on the future 
shape of the German economy was dominated by concepts such as Moralökonomie 
(moral economy), Wohlfahrtskultur (culture of welfare) and soziale Arbeit (social 
principles in the workplace) as key characteristics of the new market economy to be 
established (Pankoke, 1990:88). Seen as a socially acceptable capitalist alternative to the 
socialist command economies emerging in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Zone in Eastern 
                                                 
1 Weimarer Reichsverfassung, the Constitution of the Weimar Republic, which came into force on 14 
August 1919. 
2 The first version came into force on 19 July 1911. 
3 §§ 179, 195-200 (entitlements resulting from pregnancy and motherhood), 349-358, 360 (social security 
provisions for civil servants), 407, 409, 411-413, 414b (Association of Insurance Funds running state 
sickness insurance schemes). 
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Germany  (later to become the GDR), the resulting solution for the emerging FRG 
became known as the concept of Soziale Marktwirtschaft  (social market economy). This 
solution was regarded by many as more than just a compromise, as it contained elements 
of interest for a number of groups. The owners of the means of production would be 
happy to start investing as property ownership was regarded as sacrosanct, albeit 
regulated. The Social Democrats got the welfare principle established as a permanent role 
and responsibility of the state, and in this found much common ground with the 
proponents of moral justice, notably on the left fringe of the Catholic Church4 (see also 
Nell-Breuning, 1975:13-16; Gauly, 1992:153-157). And for the masses there was Ludwig 
Erhard’s classic promise of Wohlstand für alle, i.e. high standards of living for all, 
resulting from hard work and hence society’s ability to afford a well-developed welfare 
system for the very few needy who would be unable to participate in the new “economic 
miracle”. A number of features were incorporated into the welfare system which to this 
day seem to remain beyond questioning, such as the huge scope of coverage, both 
territorially and in terms of types of need: the mixture of elements funded by 
contributions and elements funded by taxation, the co-funding of part of the welfare 
system by both employers and employees (often in equal measure or slightly tilted 
towards higher contributions by employers), the “generation contract” where the current 
workforce pays for today’s pensions supposedly secure in the knowledge that their 
pensions would be paid by future generations of workers, and the close co-operation 
between the public administrations concerned with welfare and private and voluntary 
providers of insurance schemes and services.  
 All is well, then? The end of the economic miracle, the quantitative improvements 
of the welfare system in the 1970s, the challenges to the system caused by the 1980s 
economic slumps, the ever-increasing service costs, and not least German unification in 
1990 with millions of new entitlement holders who previously had not contributed to 
West German schemes have put increasing pressures on the German welfare system, 
                                                 
4 Its leading representative, Oswald von Nell-Breuning SJ, already established as the foremost thinker on 
Catholic social teaching, was more than willing to co-operate with the Social Democrats and the trade 
union movement, whereas the official church establishment favoured Adenauer’s new centre-right 
Christian Democrats.     
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resulting in new forms of poverty and marginalization.5 Structural reform has been 
discussed more or less permanently since the 1970s, with little result, due to the lack of 
sufficient political will to question openly the fundamental principles established in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. Both enhancements and cuts have tended to be incremental 
when introduced, and the growing funding crisis was, for some time, addressed by ever-
increasing taxes and contribution levels, by both employers and employees. Over the last 
two decades, both groups have grown increasingly restless with this spiral.  
The current critical economic climate has brought the debate to the fore and 
threatens Schröder’s hold on the political power every bit as much as it contributed to the 
ousting of Kohl in 1998. But a closer look at the German welfare system reveals that 
there are considerable limits to the Federal government’s ability to act. It is therefore 
worthwhile to investigate the territorial element of welfare provision. Part 1 of this paper 
briefly examines current theoretical approaches to the welfare role of the state in federal 
systems and discusses their applicability to the German case. Part 2 surveys the territorial 
and functional elements of the welfare system in Germany. Part 3 takes a close look at 
the practical implementation of the system in the Eastern part of the country, where the 
issues are most pressing due to what, at least by German standards, can be regarded as 
widespread deprivation. Finally, some conclusions are drawn with regard to the concept 
of territorial welfare management in Germany.   
 
 
1. Federation and welfare state: compatible concepts? 
 
The German federal system at present shows a number of organisational peculiarities in 
the distribution of functions and responsibilities for welfare issues which result from the 
construction of the German federal system. The key principles are briefly outlined in the 
federal constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG). 
Article 20(1) GG manages to press three of these key principles into a single 
sentence: “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.”6 
However, the GG is remarkably sparse in explaining what ‘social’ might mean in 
                                                 
5 For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon see Geißler, 1996:182-203. 
6 Throughout the text, English language quotes from the GG follow the translation by Axel Tschentscher 
(Tschetschner, 2002).  
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practice. Contrary to the wish list contained in the WRV, the authors of the GG have 
confined their ambitions in establishing social rights to some rather vague notions of 
protecting the family, mothers and children (Art. 6 GG). Beyond that, according to Art. 
74(1)7 GG, the öffentliche Fürsorge (public welfare)7 is a matter of konkurrierende 
Gesetzgebung, i.e. the Länder are free to act as they see fit unless the federal level 
produces either specific or framework legislation on certain matters in that field. Art. 
72(2) GG limits the federal level’s right to do so: the federation may legislate in the field 
“if and insofar as the establishment of equal living conditions in the federal territory or 
the preservation of legal and economic unity necessitates, in the interest of the state at 
large, a federal regulation”.8 This clause was changed by the 42nd Amendment, of 
27/10/1994. The previous version allowed the federation a greater freedom to act if the 
federal level deemed doing this useful – even if not strictly necessary. This apparent 
weakening of the federal level’s right to act can be regarded as part of a new trend aimed 
at making the German political system more flexible to meet the post-1990 challenges: 
“Only in the last decade or so has there been (as a legacy of the need to digest the former 
communist East) pressure to reverse the tendency to national policy standardisation and 
allow greater territorial policy variation.” (Jeffrey, 2002:180)  
 National policy standardisation, however, was – and to a very large extent still is 
– very much the order of the day in German welfare policy-making, as in a great number 
of other policy areas. Indeed, the right to establish national policy standardisation has for 
decades been seen as the main means by which the federal level is supposed to achieve 
the key idea behind Art. 72(2): the “establishment of equal living conditions” throughout 
the federation, which was more or less automatically regarded as being “in the interest of 
the state at large” – and hence all citizens, encompassed as they would be in the universal 
coverage thus established. 
 Where does this leave the federal principle, though? The remarkable success in 
establishing quite equal living conditions in the pre-1990 FRG, along with the strong 
leadership displayed by the federal government led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the 
process of unification, prompted serious questions about the nature of the German state. 
                                                 
7 In the same Article, Art. 74(1)19, a joint responsibility for the funding of hospitals is also mentioned. 
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Has it indeed become a unitary state camouflaged as a federation, as Abromeit (1992) 
suspected? Or has it retained its recognizable shape as a Bund, a union in the traditional 
sense of foedus, as Grasse (2001) argues?  In the current debate on the nature of German 
federalism there is at least some consensus insofar as it is now widely acknowledged that 
the problem of Politikverflechtung, with its associated ‘joint-decision trap’, first 
identified by Fritz W. Scharpf (Scharpf, 1985; Benz et al., 1992; Scharpf, 1994), has 
limited both the federal and Land level’s ability to act, with the result that reform projects 
in many policy areas have taken a long time in the legislative process and took on so 
much of a compromise character that they were no longer capable of fulfilling their 
original aim. Various health reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s may serve as an 
example.  
 Lessons from other federations, notably the USA as the apparently archetypal 
federal model, may provide some pointers for the German debate. Based on earlier 
investigations into the growing social deprivations of the United States’ inner cities as 
local public welfare managers found it increasingly difficult to cope with exploding 
welfare demand in the era of Reaganomics (Peterson, 1985), Peterson (1995) presents 
two theories of federalism, the functional and the legislative theory, respectively, 
designed to shed light on the domestic policy-making processes by which public policy, 
including welfare policy, is shaped.         
 
Functional theory identifies the two main economic purposes of domestic government as 
developmental and redistributive. Developmental programs provide the physical and social 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate a country’s economic growth. ... Unless these and other 
basic social services are provided, modern industrial societies are unlikely to develop. Redistributive 
programs reallocate societal resources from the “haves” to the “have-nots”. They transfer economic 
resources from those who have gained the most from economic development to those who have 
gained the least: the elderly, the disabled, the unemployed, the sick, the poor, families headed by 
single parents, and others lacking in material resources. Some analysts believe that these 
redistributive programs indirectly contribute to economic development in the long run; others think 
they retard economic development by reducing incentives to work and save. Most people regard at 
least a minimal level of redistribution as justifiable regardless of the developmental consequences. 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Where federal legislation is in place, however, it supersedes any Land legislation (Art. 31 GG), and the 
federation may act to enforce this (Art. 37 GG). 
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Most people also think that the higher the level of economic development, the more a society should 
redistribute some resources to the poor and the needy. (Peterson, 1995:17) 
 
In this rather benign scenario, holders of political responsibility – notably the executive – 
display strong leadership and provide as much public service (both developmental and 
redistributive) as public opinion would tolerate. The allocation of funds and other 
resources, along with practical tasks and responsibilities, is distributed among the levels 
of government by means of functional logic – each level or institution doing what it can 
do best, and depending on the other levels and institutions to do their job as best they can 
and create optimum conditions for the other elements in the system. The Federal level’s 
role is to set and collect taxes federally (and thus uniformly) throughout the nation, and 
secondly to instigate redistributive programmes, either in the form of general social 
security programmes which are available nation-wide but with varying take-up rates from 
region to region, or in the form of targeted grants to regions in need (either as block 
grants to state governments or, with significant regulatory strings attached, as specific 
grants or co-funding measures to public and/or private service providers). All these forms 
of redistributive measures are not uncommon in Germany either, but in the US system we 
do not see an intergovernmentally negotiated mechanism for direct horizontal 
redistribution such as the equalization payments between the German Länder 
(Länderfinanzausgleich). It is noteworthy that in the context of federal grants and fiscal 
relief provisions Peterson also uses the term ‘co-operative federalism’ (Peterson, 
1995:60). However, in this American sense the scope of this concept is limited to 
denoting steps and procedures of practical co-operation among the levels of government 
in conducting the financial redistribution function. As we shall see, the German concept 
of co-operative federalism goes far beyond mere practical co-operation between levels, to 
the point that political actors on the different levels become identical on some occasions – 
most prominent in the shape of the Bundesrat, where representatives of Land 
governments sit in a chamber of the federal Parliament.   
 By contrast, Peterson’s legislative model is characterized less by co-operation and 
more by competition among territories, with legislators trying to maximize positive 
policy outcomes for their territory – which in terms of welfare policies is likely to 
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comprise different policy contents for different territories, depending on the social 
structure of the constituencies concerned.  
 
A second theory of federalism, best characterized as legislative theory, is much less optimistic. It 
thinks that the political incentives that shape the decisions of policymakers induce them to make the 
wrong choices. The national government takes on responsibilities it should best avoid. It imposes 
unaffordable tasks on lower levels of the system. The theory bears the legislative label because it 
assumes that policies are shaped by the political needs of those who write the country’s laws. It also 
gives a less important policy role for presidents than does functional theory. It assumes that, in 
general, the preferences of presidents (and governors) have much less effect on domestic public 
policy than do preferences of the members of Congress (and state legislatures). ... Legislators’ 
opinions about redistribution are, according to legislative theory, strongly influenced by 
constituency pressures. A legislator who represents a low-income, needy population or a liberal 
constituency is likely to favor the expansion of redistributive programs. Those who represent 
middle-income constituents less likely to need government aid are more likely to resist 
redistribution. Political support for redistribution is expected to be greater in cities and states with 
higher poverty rates. Geographical politics are likely to affect redistributive decisions less than 
developmental ones. Both the costs and benefits are geographically diffuse. In addition, legislators 
apparently do not gain votes from securing more redistributive dollars for their district. Legislators 
need to balance the demands of those anticipating geographically diffuse benefits against those 
anticipating the equally diffuse tax burdens necessary to finance them. Legislators find themselves 
caught between intense demands for redistribution and equally intense opposition to tax increases. 
Whether they choose to raise taxes or to cut benefits, they are likely to be criticized. (Peterson, 
1995:39-44)   
   
At a first glance, this model with its strong emphasis on the role of legislators seems to be 
more in line with the German system, as in Germany no executive even exists without the 
express support of the legislative branch of government. And indeed the production of 
federal regulations while pushing the less glamorous implementation and funding tasks to 
the lower levels, routinely done in Germany, would be a dream come true for US 
legislators. However, there are key differences between the US and German models. 
First, the legislators’ constituency links are far less pronounced. Even in the first chamber 
of the German Parliament, the Bundestag, only half the members represent a 
constituency, while the other half are effectively party representatives elected on regional 
quota. Party discipline is very strict for both types of members. A similar situation exists 
 9 
in the single-chamber Land legislatures, the Landtage.9 The Bundesrat, the second 
chamber of the federal legislature, consists entirely of delegates from regional executives. 
Secondly, and this is probably the more important of the two key distinctions as well as 
the biggest problem, neither the federal nor the Land legislatures are constitutionally 
empowered to act unilaterally in a wide range of policy areas, with the constitutional co-
operation requirements augmented by a series of formal agreements and informal links 
from which the dense grid of Politikverflechtung is woven. So, with regard to the 
applicability of Peterson’s models to the German case there are strict limits. The 
functional and legislative theories are essentially a variation on the age-old theme of 
operating modes of the American federal system: the perpetual struggle between 
legislative and executive branch for predominance over domestic affairs, in Peterson’s 
version with a special focus on how this struggle between the two sides involves the 
federal states and large-scale urban local government, and its impact on relations between 
the levels.        
 Finally, Peterson acknowledges that regarding the welfare question not even the 
American system seems to work perfectly in line with the two models:  
 
I reported that states with higher poverty rates spent about the same on redistributive programs as 
did states with lower poverty rates. This finding is contrary to functional theory, which hypothesizes 
that states with higher levels of poverty will spend less on redistributive programs in order to avoid 
becoming a welfare magnet. It also is inconsistent with legislative theory, which says that mandates 
imposed by the national government force states with larger poor populations to spend more money 
on redistribution. To comply with federal mandates, states with more poor people are compelled to 
spend more, despite their fears of becoming a welfare magnet. (Peterson, 1995:108)   
  
So, does the US system achieve by the back door what the Germans do openly in pursuit 
of their constitutional aim of equal living conditions: national policy standardisation to 
avoid welfare tourism without resorting to a spiral of lowering welfare provisions by state 
legislatures, which Peterson (1995:108) calls a “race to the bottom”? Peterson 
subsequently (1995:111-128) argues that in a difficult economic climate an increasingly 
conservative population becomes more interested in ‘reducing the price of federalism’, 
                                                 
9 Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus, Hamburg and Bremen: Bürgerschaft.  
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and that state legislatures started to act on these demands by indeed beginning a ‘race to 
the bottom’, but that co-operation between the legislative and executive branches of  
federal government have more or less successfully prevented the worst outcomes by 
providing alternative resources in the form of federal programmes.  
 However, the German system is not designed to encourage either the members of 
the federation or the federal institutions of government to compete with each other in 
terms of domestic redistribution, or to take over each others’ functions. Moreover, co-
operation and co-ordination are the key virtues to be promoted by both the federal 
legislature (and the federal executive which depends on it) and the Land institutions of 
government (again, both legislature and executive) – while still retaining reasonably 
strong regional political actors to give voice to distinct regional interests and desires, in 
the regions themselves as well as on the federal level, through the Bundesrat. The initial 
intention behind the close links between the federal and Land levels may seem quite 
sound:          
 
Germany ... is unusual as a federal system in that it was re-established after World War II not to 
reflect distinctive regional preferences, but rather to strengthen checks and balances on political 
power after the Third Reich. Its guiding constitutional rationale – crafted against the background of 
extreme social and economic dislocation caused by war and national division – was to attain and 
maintain a ‘uniformity of living conditions’, not to promote territorial diversity. To that end the 
main role of the regions – the Länder – is to participate in the formulation of national legislative 
standards through Germany’s territorial second chamber and then to apply those standards 
on the ground. The Länder do possess a range of their own legislative powers, but these 
have typically been absorbed into joint federal-Länder decision-making ... or subjected to a 
voluntary co-ordination of standards across the Länder... The dense co-ordination of federation and 
Länder in generating common nation-wide standards of public policy has aptly been termed ‘co-
operative’ federalism. (Jeffery, 2002:180) 
 
This gives the Länder an almost unique scope of access to decision-making on the federal 
level, which often is the envy of many regions and stateless nations within the EU. Yet 
the constitutional requirement to exercise these rights jointly rather than individually and 
to co-ordinate policies has severe consequences for policy-formulation by the Länder. 
The regional debates are often dominated by what can be achieved on the federal level. 
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Federal party politics also has a strong influence on these considerations, in particular 
since for much of its existence the Bundesrat has seen majorities which were different 
from the majorities in the first chamber of the federal Parliament, the Bundestag, whose 
majority determines the composition of the federal government. For this reason in 
particular, the co-operation on which the German ‘co-operative federalism’ so clearly  
depends has often been in short supply after the end of the Grand Coalition in 1969. The 
second half of Helmut Schmidt’s chancellorship (1974-1982) can probably be regarded 
as the worst period of co-operative federalism breaking down.  
 This is not to say that co-operative federalism does not work at all. If the 
challenges and external pressures are severe enough, such as with several reforms of 
regional development policy-coordination both before and after the introduction of a 
distinct EC/EU regional policy, and with the economic reconstruction tasks derived from 
German unifications since 1990, a close working relationship between the federal and 
Land levels can produce enormous benefits. This close working relationship, however, 
entirely depends on the political will of the various governments to commit themselves 
(and their resources) to it – and this political will is in turn shaped by regional interests, 
pressures and desires. With sufficient political will lacking, and the constitutionally 
proscribed inability of the governments (both federal and Land) to act unilaterally, very 
little can be achieved – the ‘joint decision trap’ snaps shut. The outcome of this situation 
is commonly referred to as Reformstau, a backlog of necessary reforms which lack  
political support to get enacted – with perhaps only a lowest-common-denominator 
solution or an incremental (rather than substantial) alteration to the status quo being 
established instead.  
 A key element of the welfare state reform debates in Germany – as elsewhere – 
focuses on the issue of funding. A comprehensive welfare system is expensive, and, 
sadly, becomes less affordable in times when society’s need for it increases, i.e. in times 
of economic crisis. Both the immediate post-unification period and the current economic 
crisis have demonstrated this to the Germans only too clearly. Years of Reformstau, 
followed by a significant economic downturn at present have led to a situation where two 
seemingly contradictory phenomena, both driven by popular and interest group demand, 
have appeared on the German political landscape. On the one hand, political actors have 
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recognised that to continue current practices is likely to become completely unaffordable 
in the not too distant future. So, in principle, the preparedness to muster the political will 
for substantial reform is rising – not only on the part of the federal government, but also 
in the Länder. On the other hand, however, there is a distinct tendency among interest 
groups to prevent uncomfortable reforms in their particular area of interest – the key 
word here is Bestandsschutz – reforms, yes please, but not in our backyard, or only on 
our terms. With regard to the territorial dimension, some Land governments – notably the 
Bavarian and Saxon governments – have started to display a similar attitude. Reforms, 
though necessary, should be differentiated and enacted on a smaller (i.e. Land) territorial 
scale, to allow a more precise addressing of specific needs, and within the territory’s own 
resource structure. Such strong tendencies to say farewell to the constitutional principle 
of establishing equal living conditions throughout the federation, and towards de-
solidarization within the German society have not been seen since the 1960s, before the 
establishment of the regional development joint task (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 
Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur).10 The political will to enact federal 
reforms decreases, at least on the part of the Länder, on whose co-operation any federal 
reforms legally depend. By the same token, the Länder are very limited in their own 
freedom of manoeuvre unless they get the permission – or at least acquiescence – for 
their own reform ideas from the federal level. It is this context in which the current 
welfare reform debate in Germany takes place.                  
 
 
2. Territorial and functional elements of the welfare state in the German 
federal system    
 
The organisation of the welfare state in Germany has been a very typical example of 
joint-decision making, or ‘co-operative federalism’, if one prefers.  The federal level has 
consistently taken up its right to act directly and specifically (Art. 72 (2) GG) in only two 
                                                 
10 At that time, the Länder – then only the Western ones, of course – were engaging in an increasingly cut-
throat competition to attract inward investment. As it became clear that overall society’s costs for this 
competition started to outweigh the benefits for individual regions, the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe was put in 
place to stop this trend. 
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major welfare-related matters. One is employment management, in particular the 
administration of unemployment-related benefits and the promotion of job creation 
schemes (Gagel, 2002:X). The second area is the management of state pensions. In all 
other welfare matters the federal level has been limiting itself to either providing the 
specific regulations but leaving the implementation to Land or local authorities, or to just 
setting general framework regulations which the Länder are obliged to fill – but with a 
considerable room for manoeuvre.  
This is not to say that the federation was not active in ensuring that the federal 
regulations provide comprehensive coverage of a wide range of social needs. The so far 
ten volumes of the Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB), a collection of various social security 
provisions11, plus associated acts cover an  enormous range of specific entitlements in 
four key categories: (i) insurance-based entitlements (sickness, accidents at work, 
unemployment, pensions and care for the elderly); (ii) state compensations for victims of 
difficult or dangerous circumstances beyond their control (wars, losses incurred while 
serving in armed forces, political injustices by the former GDR regime, crime and 
terrorism), (iii) state promotion of social development (student loan/grants, funding for 
participation in adult education schemes, housing benefits, childcare benefits, disability 
allowances, etc.), and (iv) state social security for anyone having needs not covered by 
any other scheme and being unable to cope with these needs on his or her own, in 
particular one-off help in specific difficult situations (e.g. bereavement), and longer-term 
help with on-going living expenses.12      
Overall, Germany usually spends just under one third of its Gross Domestic 
Product on welfare matters.13 The 2000 figures may serve as an example (Table 1). 
 
                                                 
11 Contents (latest full-text versions; most parts have seen minor amendments recently): SGB I General 
Provisions (1975), [no SGB II], SGB III Promotion of Employment (1997), SGB IV Joint Regulations (for 
all SGB parts; 1976), SGB V Sickness (1988), SGB VI Pensions (2002), SGB VII Accidents at Work 
(1996), SGB VIII Children and Juveniles (1998), SGB IX Disability (2001), SGB X Administrative 
procedures and data protection (2001), SGB XI Care for the Elderly (1994).   
12 A more detailed listing of types of support can be found in Schulin, 2002:XVI-XIX.  
13 This puts Germany close to the EU average of 29%; within the EU the percentage varies between 21% in 
Ireland and 37% in Sweden (Hanesch, 1998:18).  
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Table 1. German Welfare Expenditure 2000, by type    
Type of Expenditure Amount (bn DM) 
State Pensions (contribution-based) 425 
Sickness Benefits (insurance-based)* 258 
Accidents at Work Benefits (insurance-based)* 21 
Care for the Elderly (insurance-based)* 33 
Unemployment-related Support (approx. one third insurance-based)** 127 
Childcare Benefit (taxation-funded)  7 
Top-up Pensions for Farmers (partially contribution-based) 6 
Compensations for Victims (taxation-funded)* 10 
Support for Juveniles (excluding education; taxation-funded) 33 
People in Higher/Further Education (half taxation-funded, half loan)  2 
Housing Benefit (taxation-funded) 8 
Social Security Benefits (taxation-funded)* 50 
Other Social Security Measures (taxation-funded)* 350 
Total 1,330 
* Disability Allowances may be paid out of any of these sources (or a combination thereof),  
depending on the nature of the disability, and on the reason why it came about. 
** Arbeitslosengeld (unemployment benefit) is insurance-based, Arbeitslosenhilfe (lower-level 
unemployment benefit for those whose insurance entitlements have run out) 14  and special funding for job-
seeking activities and participation in re-training measures are taxation-funded.  
Source of figures: Schulin, 2002:XIX.  
 
The principle of allowing territorial variations in social security provisions is particularly 
relevant concerning the legislation for the worst cases of hardship, i.e. persons entitled to 
receive support under the Bundessozialhilfegesetz (Federal Social Security Benefits Act, 
BSHG).15 This act is the archetypal example of framework legislation, setting absolute 
minimum standards, but devolving all specific responsibilities, including funding, to 
Land and local authorities, with some encouragement for them to lay on additional 
provisions to the best of their ability. Therefore, most Länder have used §§ 96-101 BSHG 
to devolve welfare matters – and the financial obligations that go with it – further, to the 
sub-regional and local levels (Überörtlicher Träger and Örtlicher Träger der Sozialhilfe, 
respectively). The basic idea of bringing social security matters as close to the citizens as 
possible sounds applaudable, and indeed, with the exception of Berlin, all Land 
regulations define the local authorities as principal holders of responsibility for the people 
residing in their area. 
                                                 
14 In the current reform debate, it is envisaged to merge Arbeitslosenhilfe with the standard Social Security 
Benefit, Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt, at a level slightly above the old Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt.  
15 The BSHG is not (yet) part of the SGB, so that it can be more flexible in defining entitlements and actual 
local or regional implementation than the generally stricter provisions of the SGB canon, although the 
general principle of social security in hardship cases is outlined in § 9 SGB I.    
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However, the Länder show different ambitions in determining the engagement of 
the Land in the process, often arising out of welfare-related clauses in the Land 
constitutions and resulting in different administrative practices with regard to the 
organisation and funding of welfare. Pestalozza (1999:XLIV) argues that the new (ex-
GDR) Länder, shaping their constitutions in the 1990s, have been more cautious and 
hence more realistic in defining their welfare engagement. Indeed, the post-war climate 
of a new beginning has led West German Land constitution-framers straight into the 
WRV trap of defining a number of social rights, such as the right to work16, which might 
have sounded appropriate at the time. With hindsight, one can now argue that these 
ambitions were unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term – but it is not surprising that 
so far nobody has yet summoned the political will to change these provisions. 
Nevertheless, the Eastern Länder benefited from this experience and thus limited their 
approach to the definition of state aims, general political declarations of intent, 
encouraging – but not legally forcing – any Land government to do as much as they can 
to achieve these aims.17  
The different ambitions and intentions also filter down into the administrative 
practice insofar as the Länder may be more or less willing to supplement the welfare 
expenditures by local authorities. Normally, social security benefits are paid by the local 
authorities in whose territory the recipient resides. This expenditure is supposed to be  
funded by locally raised business rates (Gewerbesteuer)  and the local authorities’ share 
of income tax revenue. The Länder therefore need to consider local authorities’ ability to 
pay when defining, by annual review, the Land minimum standard rates (Regelsätze), and 
the household threshold incomes which, if not reached, trigger entitlement.18 For the 
1999-2000 calculation period (1 July –  30 June), the Regelsätze for the first adult per 
household19 per month varied by DM 26, from DM 522 in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Saxony and Thuringia to DM 548 in Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. The highest-paying 
                                                 
16 See, for instance, Art. 166(2) of the Bavarian Constitution, and Art. 28(2) of the Hessian Constitution.   
17 See, for instance, Art. 45(1) of the Brandenburg Constitution, and Art. 7 of the Saxon Constitution.   
18 In 1997, the eligibility rates for this direct income support were 3.6 persons per 1000 residents in the 
Western Länder and 3.3 persons per 1,000 residents in the Eastern Länder (Maretzke and Irmen, 1998:5). 
The eligibility rates in the Western Länder is somewhat higher as the household threshold incomes are on 
average 15% higher than in the Eastern Länder – roughly in line with the still prevailing differences in 
wage incomes (but not living expenses, which are now almost equal in both parts of the country).     
19 Further adults and minors receive a fixed percentage of this standard minimum. 
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East German Land was Saxony-Anhalt (DM 527), the lowest-paying West German Land 
was Bavaria (DM 530) (BSHG, 2000:70). However, § 22(1)2 BSHG specifies that 
deviations from the standard provisions may be applicable according to a person’s 
circumstances.  
As much of the welfare bill – with the exception of insurance-based schemes and 
certain federally administered employment promotion schemes – is paid out of local 
taxation, the scope and quality of available services varies more widely than the 
differences in direct payments to claimants suggests. As welfare-related expenditure is 
usually one of the largest expenditure types in local government, communities with a 
high numbers of residents are put under the most strain, even when locally generated 
revenues are relatively high, e.g. in the larger West German urban areas such as the Ruhr 
area. Financial Land support for the locally incurred expenditures is therefore crucial, but 
administrative practice in this matter varies considerably. A common feature of Land  
support is compensation payments to local authorities for the funding of institutions and 
specialist services (rehabilitation clinics, youth centres etc.) used by residents of other 
local authority areas, in whose territory such institutions and services are not available. In 
other fields, though, the funding practice varies considerably (see Table 2). In most 
Länder, a system of mixed funding has been established. Local tasks are funded 
predominantly locally, with more or less additional input from the Land. Brandenburg 
and Saxony, for instance, take on the additional burden of fully funding local support 
institutions. Bavaria, by contrast, leaves it to the upper tier of local government to fulfil 
even the regional requirements. Schleswig-Holstein even demands a 61% contribution by 
the local authorities for regional tasks. However, there is no direct correlation between a 
Land’s overall wealth and its social engagement. The relatively poor Brandenburg, 
Saxony, and The Saar are happy to take on considerable responsibilities, while the 
relatively rich Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria limit their involvement as much as they 
can – as do the relatively poor Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony-Anhalt and Bremen. 
Berlin remains a special case as it is the only Land to keep responsibility for the entire 
welfare bill with the Land government – normally not a problem, but with the current 
self-inflicted funding crisis (general financial mismanagement by the previous 
government), the current government has already had to embark on a series of cut-backs 
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across the entire city. So far these cuts  have mostly focussed on the funding of non-
governmental welfare service providers (freie Träger), which are now in principle funded 
on a case-by-case basis as each welfare recipient has to apply to the competent district 
authority of his or her place of residence for the funding of each individual service to be 
provided. This differs considerably from the previous practice of funding the freie Träger 
by block grants (Zuwendungsfinanzierung). Administrative practices in the 
implementation of the new Berlin-wide regulations and the speed of processing 
applications and payments now vary even more widely from district to district. This also 
applies to support schemes for non-German residents, e.g. asylum seekers. Some districts 
hand out cash, while others operate “entitlement card” or voucher schemes.      
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Table 2. Land Involvement in Local Welfare Services Funding, by Land*   
Land 
(Year of 
legislation**) 
Living 
Expen-
ses 
Advice 
and 
Coun-
selling  
Special 
Needs 
 
Funding 
for 
instituti-
ons 
Regional 
responsi-
bilities 
 
Regional 
responsi-
bilities 
devolved ? 
BSHG §§ 
(1994) 
11, 12, 
21, 22  
17 13-15b, 
27,  
36-41, 
68-69c 
93-95 39(1), 67, 
72,  
100-101 
96(2),  
151(2)*** 
Baden-W. (1963) no no no no part LWV       
Bavaria (1993) no no no no no LG 
Berlin (1962) full full full full full no 
Brandenburg 
(1996) 
no part no full full no 
Bremen (1962) no no no part full no 
Hamburg (1971) part part part part full LG 
Hesse (1970) part part part part part LWV 
Lower Saxony 
(1999) 
part part part part full no 
Mecklenburg-V. 
(1992) 
no no no no full no 
North Rhine-W.  
(1999) 
part part part part part LWV 
Rhine Land-P. 
(1963) 
part no part no full no 
Saxony (1991) no no part full part LWV 
Saxony-A. (1991) no no no no full no 
Schleswig-H. 
(1985) 
no no no no part no 
The Saar (1995) part no part part full no 
Thuringia (1993) part part part part full no 
LG = Local Government (Bavaria: upper tier, Bezirke; Hamburg: see below). 
LWV = Landeswohlfahrtsverbände (North Rhine-Westphalia: Landschaftsverbände), consortia of public, 
private and voluntary sector service providers. They are only partially funded by the state, the amounts they 
receive from public sources depends partially on service costs and partially on political decisions on how 
worthy their cause is judged by the Land and local authorities – and the funds situation of these authorities. 
* based on a comparison of the applicable Land legislation, i.e. the 16 BSHG Implementation Acts.  
** year in which the full text of the current version of each Act was introduced or significantly changed. 
Most of these acts have seen minor amendments since.  
*** § 96(2) BSHG leaves it to the Länder whom to charge with regional responsibilities. As is usual in 
most German federal framework legislation, § 151(2) BSHG allows the three city-states to deviate from the 
standard divisions of local and regional responsibilities (§§ 99-101 BSHG). Berlin decided to keep all 
financial responsibilities at the Land level. Bremen defined the two Land parts City of Bremen and City of 
Bremerhaven as the holders of local responsibility while the Land kept the regional responsibilities. 
Hamburg defined the City District Authorities (Bezirksämter) as the holders of local responsibility, and 
divided the regional responsibilities functionally among designated District Authorities, with full financial 
compensation to these designated authorities by the Land.    
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The problem of welfare management is further complicated by the fact that most items of 
federal and regional welfare regulations are littered with optional clauses, i.e. a support 
measure may be provided but the applicant has no absolute legal entitlement to receive 
the support claimed. Indeed, the applicable regulations usually leave it to the individual 
civil servant to assess an applicant’s specific needs. This goes in particular for the 
provision of additional funds to cover larger one-off expenses such as clothing, heating 
materials, repairs and renovations of flats and their contents, purchases of household 
equipment and special occasions. In theory, there are few limits to what can be claimed 
under these regulations (§§ 15, 15a, 21(1a) and 72 BSHG), ranging from an extra pair of 
woollen Winter socks to structural repairs to residential buildings costing hundreds of 
thousands of Euro.  
Each Land has semi-official lists of provisions that are normally granted more or 
less automatically on application, while claiming provisions not covered there either 
leads to immediate rejection or triggers an extensive process of checking the actual need. 
Land regulations usually also specify the frequency of entitlements for recurring 
provisions. These regulations are reviewed annually, investigating take-up rates as well 
as the Land’s and the local authorities’ ability to pay. However, often extensive yet not 
publicly available internal guidelines for needs assessors have a strong influence on the 
individual applicant’s personal experience with the system. Means tests are strict in all 
cases, and often family members or persons with whom the applicant shares a residence 
(even unrelated co-habitants) are required to pay all or part of the applicant’s living 
expenses before the state gets involved. But once the applicant has passed these tests, and 
if the need is established, there are still no absolute guarantees concerning the speed and 
scope of provisions. In effect, the individual welfare bureaucrat rules whether in a 
particular individual case the applicant is worthy of receiving certain sums, goods or 
services at the public’s expense. There are administrative and legal appeals procedures, 
but there is much scope for abuse by claimants on the one hand, and for bullying by 
bureaucrats, on the other hand. Sadly, both phenomena are rather commonplace. 
As a result, some districts provide a better service, while other localities provide 
only the minimum standards allowed by the framework regulations – and still may end up 
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heavily in debt because of this. Therefore, the German system is extremely fragmented 
and applicants often do not receive a fair or equal deal, even within the same region. In 
1999, the federal level has recognised this problem and was prepared to use federal 
legislation to make amends, without undermining the principle of regional and local self-
determination. The federal legislation, § 101a BSHG, therefore contained a time-
limited20 invitation to Land governments to experiment with models of harmonisation 
and the use of standard provisions (Pauschalisierte Leistungserbringung). The results of 
these experiments will be discussed between the Land governments and the federal 
government before possibly further federal regulations or recommendations are going to 
be put in place.    
 
 
3. East Germany: new role-model welfare system or bottomless pit? 
 
The East German Länder  face a number of specific welfare-relate problems arising out 
of a trap created by the mixture of federal regulation and regional/local implementation. 
The federal constitutional concept of striving for equal living conditions (Gleichheit der 
Lebensverhältnisse) demands that standards of social security are to be applied in – more 
or less – the same scope and quantity throughout the federation, including the Eastern 
Länder. Over the 40 years of separate development, the West German social security 
system has developed into a network of very comprehensive coverage, as intended by the 
founding fathers, and has been kept going even through periods of relative economic 
decline and rising unemployment. As Bulmahn (1998:11) argues, these adverse 
conditions put a notable strain on the West German economy over time, but by gradually 
increasing contributions to insurance-based welfare schemes and by gradually eroding the 
levels of entitlements and services as and when required, the system as a whole has been 
preserved.  
In recent years, however, these two incremental strategies have become less and 
less effective, giving rise to a debate about radical systematic reform involving new 
concepts of social security. These new concepts included introducing elements of 
                                                 
20 25/06/1999 – 31/12/2004 
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privatisation and individualisation, e.g. deregulation in the sickness insurance schemes 
which are managed by the private sector anyway, and also a strengthening of individuals’ 
personal responsibilities, in particular with regard to pensions. Furthermore, there have 
been several attempts to lighten the load on taxation-funded state schemes, but so far less 
in expenditure types affecting individual personal entitlements and more concerning 
institutional and infrastructural expenditure, e.g. funding for job creation schemes or 
funding for voluntary sector organisations supporting welfare recipients. The idea was 
more targeted funding for specific needs, and having longer-term effects in reducing the 
welfare bill by eroding provisions seen as contributing to a prolongation of dependency. 
While not exactly a ‘race to the bottom’, these considerations were nevertheless the 
product of increasingly conservative thinking in times of a difficult economic climate – 
without publicly admitting any attack on the established welfare state. The Kohl 
government had already set this trend with various schemes in the 1990s, such as the 
Kanzlerrunde, aimed at reducing unemployment.21 In 1998, the incoming Schröder 
government saw the reform of the social security system as one of its key tasks. Indeed, 
at that time Schröder (Bundesregierung, 1998:25) went as far as to compare the 
envisaged social security network to a “trampoline”: anyone falling into it would not only 
not slip through the net but, moreover, should be able to bounce right back into non-
dependency. To this end, he announced a series of federal support measures, mainly in 
order to jump-start the employment market (Bündnis für Arbeit), in co-operation with 
employers, the unions, the education sector and the voluntary sector.  
During the last few years, and in particular since the federal elections of 
September 2002 which saw the current government comprising Social Democrats and 
Greens hold on to power by the thinnest of margins in the Bundestag, the German welfare 
reform debate has gained momentum. In March 2003, Schröder instigated a 
comprehensive review of all work- and welfare-related matters, including a complete 
review of administrative practices, known as Agenda 2010 (Bundesregierung, 2003). 
What is unusual in this context is that most details of the reform agenda were to be 
developed not by the political parties or the civil service, but by two independent expert 
                                                 
21 One of Kohl’s catchphrases was Arbeit muss sich wieder lohnen, i.e. “to work must again become 
worthwhile”, used to justify a driving-down of social security entitlements to increase the gap between 
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commissions, with the government committing itself to taking their advice. The first 
commission’s brief comprised all employment market matters, while the second 
commission was put in charge of finding long-term financially sustainable solutions for 
all welfare matters.22 Their proceedings have sparkled a substantial public debate, and a 
series of reform steps has since been started, after considerable debate in both chambers 
of the parliament,  with the Christian Democrats torn between their agreement on most of 
the reform contents – with many measures appearing to be quite hard on citizens’ private 
purses – and their party-political instinct not to support a politically vulnerable and 
increasingly unpopular Social Democrat Chancellor.              
For some interest organisations, notably the Federation of German Industry 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), the reforms currently in progress do not 
go far enough. Couched in terms of keeping the German industry’s competitiveness up to 
the requirements of not only today but also tomorrow, the BDI has essentially argued23 
that something akin to a ‘race to the bottom’ would probably not be a bad idea: 
constitutional changes would be in order to facilitate a transformation of German 
Federalism towards a federalism of competition (Wettbewerbsföderalismus). Moreover, a 
greater regional differentiation, so far not part of the Agenda 2010, would also be 
welcome: There would be no reason why welfare services, and indeed wages, should be 
uniform in all Länder – a point also made by some of the Länder (see above).  
It would certainly be quite inaccurate to blame all the current economic and social 
difficulties in the German federal system on the German unification and its aftermath.  
However, the German unification must be regarded as a massive systemic shock to the 
entire German concept of social security coverage. In accordance with the concept of 
equality of living conditions, West German social security regulations became applicable 
in East Germany virtually overnight on 03/10/1990.24 The decision to make the West 
                                                                                                                                                 
social security payouts and low-wage job incomes.  
22 The commissions were called Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt and Kommission für die 
Nachhaltigkeit in der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme, but popularly became better known as 
the Hartz-Kommission and the Rürup-Kommission, based on the names of their chairmen, Dr. Peter Hartz 
and Professor Bert Rürup.    
23 See their key position paper for the current 15th legislative period, Für ein innovationsorientiertes 
Deutschland (BDI, 2003).  
24 With the exceptions outlined in Art. 17-25 of the Treaty on Creating a Monetary, Economic and Social 
Union [WWSV; 01/07/1990], and Art. 7 and 30-33 of the Treaty on German Unification [EV; 03/10/1990]. 
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German social security legislation applicable in the East immediately was probably a 
political necessity to prepare the ground for the political union. After all, the greatest fear 
among the East Germans, and the only serious source of political resistance against 
unification, was the fear of social insecurity. A population which was accustomed to a 
perfectly organised welfare state with virtually no unemployment, subsidised living 
expenses, including housing and public transport, generous support schemes for families 
and children, and access to free healthcare on demand, and also, thanks to West German 
television, well-informed of the social shortcomings of the West German system, needed 
a lot of convincing, despite the allure of a potentially far higher material standard of 
living associated with having the DM in one’s pocket.  
However, the months and years immediately after the unification saw the 
complete overhaul of the East German economy, creating almost instant mass 
unemployment (3.4m jobs lost, over a third of all jobs that existed on unification day – 
see Maretzke and Irmen, 1999:4), an enormous amount of re-training needs, and millions 
of new welfare entitlement holders.       
Three factors, to some extent intertwined, can be distinguished which created very 
difficult conditions for the establishment of the Western-type welfare state in the Eastern 
Länder: (i) a lack of previous contribution payments, (ii) significant demographic shifts 
in patterns of residency and employment, and (iii) a severely limited ability of local 
authorities to raise revenues on the local level.   
 With regard to the lack of previous contributions, it has to be noted that only the 
smaller part of the East German welfare expenses were paid out of the 
Sozialversicherungskasse (SVK), a blanket state-run national insurance system which in 
effect was little more than a general fund to supplement state expenditures on politically 
defined needs and social engineering intentions. One’s entitlement usually did not depend 
on the amount of contributions paid in, but on actual need (e.g., sickness), or on personal 
social circumstances which attracted special attention and support by the state (e.g., 
families with three or more children). The only notable exception to this rule was 
pensions, where the sums received by pensioners did depend on contributions previously 
paid in by the individual. However, workers usually had a lump sum deducted from pay 
packets for all other social service entitlements. These deductions normally amounted to 
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less than a quarter of the gross wages, and the sums thus raised came nowhere near the 
sums spent by the state on welfare matters. The difference was paid from profits of the 
state-run industries, which were not “taxed” in the Western sense or forced to co-
contribute (along with the employee) to individual insurance schemes, as was the West 
German practice. Instead, the East German companies received budget allocations 
covering their running expenses, and any revenue – above the following year’s allocation 
– resulting from the company’s business activities had to be handed over to the state 
(Gewinnabführung). The privatisation or closure of these companies following 
unification cut off this source of revenue for the state, and usually there were no 
alternative schemes in place. With regard to unemployment, for instance, the full 
employment in East Germany meant that the GDR government had seen no need to run 
an unemployment insurance scheme. Only in the process of German unification, in 
particular the monetary, economic and social union which started on 1 July 1990, were 
such schemes introduced in the GDR. Therefore, neither the federal government nor the 
new, Western-style regional and local authorities had any former GDR funds available to 
cover those welfare expenses which in the West were insurance-based. The shortfall had 
to be paid out of the newly raised contributions, and federal tax revenue, not least the new 
Solidaritätszuschlag, a 7.5% surcharge on income tax to be paid on all incomes, in both 
East and West.25     
 
                                                 
25 Initially, the Solidaritätszuschlag was sold politically by the Kohl government as a time-limited payment 
to jump-start the East German economy, mainly by modernising the physical infrastructure 
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ‘Aufschwung Ost’), i.e. a developmental task, but in the event the welfare bill, i.e. a 
redistributive task, proved to be the greater headache compared to the one-off infrastructure-related 
projects. The latter are now mostly complete, but the on-going welfare costs have made it unlikely that the 
Zuschlag is going to be abolished any time soon. However, it has recently been lowered to 5.5%.   
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Table 3. Federal Start-up funding for East German Welfare Schemes, 1990-1991  
 
Scheme  Period  Start-up funds (m DM) 
State Pensions  1990 (July-Dec.) 750 
Unemployment Benefits 1990 (July-Dec.) 2,000 
Unemployment Benefits 1991 (Jan.-Dec.) 3,000 
Source: Art. 28 WWSV.  
 
According to Art. 17-25 WWSV, further funding for other welfare schemes was available 
on application by the GDR government. The applications had to be made by 02/10/1990, 
including those for the 1991 financial year.26 There was a request to specify the detailed 
financial need, which would be met out of a general grant to balance the GDR budget 
(Finanzzuweisung zum Haushaltsausgleich) by the FRG Government, which was not 
limited to welfare matters. The general grant limits were DM 22bn for the second half of 
1990 and DM 35bn for the whole of 1991 (Art. 28(1) WWSV).  
The key issue in getting the East German welfare system up and running under 
the new structures, however, was the double strain of reduced tax and contributions 
income, and the triggering of new entitlements associated with a person becoming 
unemployed. In terms of unemployment, the East-West divide could not be more 
obvious. By 1998, regional disparities had emerged which have become relatively stable 
since. All East German local government districts apart from the Eichsfeld, a small strip 
of Thuringia along the borders to Bavaria and Hesse, showed unemployment rates of at 
least 125% of the federal average.27 By contrast, none of the West German local 
government districts were in that category, and only about one fifth of the West German 
districts showed rates around the federal average (districts along the old inner-German 
border, Northwestern Lower Saxony, the central part of North Rhine Westphalia, and The 
Saar). By contrast, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Northern Rhine Land-Palatinate, and 
Northern North Rhine-Westphalia, showed unemployment rates of less than 75% of the 
federal average (Maretzke and Irmen, 1998:5). Between December 1991 and June 1998, 
unemployment in the Eastern Länder rose by 57%, as the number of industrial jobs in 
existence declined by 65%. The service sector, despite going through a phase of massive 
                                                 
26 In Germany, the financial year is identical with the calendar year. 
27 In the late 1990s, the federal average remained relatively stable at around 11.6% of the overall labour 
pool, i.e. approx. 4.4m people.  
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expansion, was clearly unable to absorb that much labour. Indeed, between 1991 and 
1996, employment in the service sector rose by only 2% (Maretzke and Irmen, 1998:8).     
It is therefore not surprising that many East Germans saw their personal way out 
of this crisis in a move to the West, or, to a lesser extent, abroad. Between 1991 and 
1997, the East German districts saw an average loss of population of 4.6%. Most affected 
were the cities over 100,000 inhabitants, where the average loss was 11.8% (Sahner, 
1999:30). One could cynically argue that this was perhaps even beneficial for the Eastern 
communities as the welfare responsibility for these people moved with them.28 However, 
it was often the younger generations and the better qualified members of the workforce – 
i.e. the most employable – who moved out of the Eastern districts, while people who 
were more likely to need social security benefits tended to stay put – a clear example of 
national policy standardization preventing welfare tourism. It is therefore not surprising 
that by the late 1990s, many Germans residing in the Eastern Länder had not only 
accepted the new Western-style welfare system, but had tended to become vociferous 
supporters of its continued existence without too many changes.29   
Consistent demands for an extensive welfare state make a debate on the funding 
of welfare provisions inevitable. Prior to 1998, federal debates on welfare reform rarely 
went beyond a general agreement on the need to save money. While several federal 
reform steps in the two federally administered schemes, employment management and 
pensions, have been introduced more or less successfully in the last decade or so, the real 
funding crisis is prevalent on the local level. Virtually nowhere in Germany are local 
authorities able to meet all their expenses. The local authorities have three main 
categories of income: local business rates,  service charges/fees, and their legally 
guaranteed share of federal and regional taxes (in particular income tax). A typical West 
German local authority may raise as much as 35% of its budgetary needs from local 
business rates, while comparable East German authorities are normally pleased to raise 
about 15% in that way. Federal and regional tax shares in the West usually account for 
about 25-30% of the authority’s budget, in the East it may be as much as 55% (down 
                                                 
28 Not for pensioners and recipients of disability allowance resulting from accidents at work. Financial 
responsibility for those, if they moved after 18/05/90, remained with the East German authorities (Art. 
20(7) and 23(4) WWSV).   
29 A very good analysis of this phenomenon can be found in Schaub, 1998:131-158. 
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from over 75% in the early 1990s).30  All over Germany, local authorities have 
occasionally received additional support from the federation or the Land, often paid in the 
form of special support for individual projects, such as one-off help with capital 
expenditures associated with improving the local infrastructure. In the East German 
Länder, where infrastructure projects were often the second largest cost factors (behind 
personnel costs) in the early years after unification, ERDF (Objective 1), ESF and 
EAGGF funds also were a significant source of income, but this factor, strictly linked to 
developmental tasks, has declined considerably since 1999 and is likely to be phased out 
by 2006 in all but the worst-affected areas. The welfare bill, however, is likely to gain 
increased significance. As Sahner (1999:33) shows, West German authorities spend 
around 20% of their budgets on welfare matters. In the East, this rate is still only around 
15% (up from just 4.5% in 1991), but this picture is distorted by the disproportionally 
higher rate of capital expenditure in the East. Still, in both East and West local authorities 
face an annual budgetary shortfall of 20-25%, to be covered either by the extra federal 
and Land support measures mentioned above, or by taking on public debts, resulting in 
interest payments of as much as 4.5% of an authority’s annual budget.  
Such protracted funding problems are not without consequences for the social 
acceptability of the welfare state. Local authorities are forced to deliver welfare 
provisions which are mainly set in places beyond their control, either federally or 
regionally. Due to a chronic funding shortage locally, hardly any community is able to 
deliver provisions beyond these externally set minimum standards. Not surprisingly, local 
authorities, in particular in the East but also, for instance, in Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein 
and Lower Saxony, have recently sought to reduce the financial pressures by other 
means. Draconian interpretations of optional clauses in the applicable legislation do help 
but can achieve only so much. However, an increasingly popular route over the last few 
years was to use the welfare recipient’s labour for local authority tasks or local 
businesses, such as maintaining public parks and gardens, cleaning public areas, or 
providing a cheap source of seasonal labour in agriculture and tourism. The relevant 
federal legislation in this area, §§ 18-20 BSHG, constitutes a double-edged sword. The 
legislation allows – and indeed encourages – the use of such measures, to “accustom” 
                                                 
30 For a more detailed analysis see Sahner, 1999:32-34.   
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welfare recipients, in particular young ones, to regular work. However, work creation 
schemes for social security recipients are supposed to create additional work31, not to 
substitute welfare recipients for council workers or properly employed casual labour. Yet 
this is exactly what seems to happen in most East German cities, and in the rural areas of 
Northern Germany. In particular the “not been carried out to the same extent” and “not 
been carried out at this particular point in time” clauses allow enough room for 
manoeuvre for local authorities to cut corners on the primary service provisions and fill 
the gaps with welfare recipients. In one of the most incredible acts of creativity of federal 
framework regulation-writing, § 19(2)1 BSHG even allows the local authority to choose 
whether to pay the draftees the proper salary for the job or the standard social security 
benefits (plus a small allowance for additional expenses, such as for transport to and from 
work). No prizes for guessing which of the two options is usually chosen. Federal 
authorities and the local Job Centres do not complain – people on such schemes are not 
counted as unemployed. 
 
 
Conclusions            
  
The first point to note is that the principle of federalism, supposedly allowing for greater 
regional self-determination, and the principle of striving for equality of living conditions, 
are now in open conflict. The current German system is in constant search for a 
compromise between the two ideals, with only partial success: Politikverflechtung as the 
guiding principle of co-operative federalism, initially hailed as a sound solution, has led 
to the joint-decision trap and thus has itself become a significant part of the problem. 
Putting welfare into the concurrent legislation category seemed a logical choice in the 
early days of the FRG. However, in practice, the system that emerged was a functional 
division of labour which favoured centralised decision-making while putting the 
implementation burden on the lower levels of government. Regional influences and 
freedoms regarding welfare decision-making have been eroded as federal governments 
                                                 
31 § 19(2)1 BSHG defines “additional work” as “work which otherwise would not have been carried out, 
not been carried out to the same extent, or not been carried out at this particular point in time”. 
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saw welfare as a key priority on their domestic policy agenda. The extensive and detailed 
welfare legislation incorporated in the SGB has certainly contributed to achieving a high 
standard of social security, with roughly equal basic standards throughout the federation. 
To a lesser extent, the same applies to certain federal welfare regulations outside the 
SGB, in particular the BSHG.  
While one may well regard this as a success, some questions remain concerning 
the federal level’s preparedness to put their money where their mouth is. So far, the 
federal level has become massively engaged in managing welfare matters only in the 
employment management sector. In a sense, this was the right way forward. After all, 
employment is the crucial factor in both  determining a society’s welfare needs as well as 
in generating a society’s wealth which determines the level of social security which is 
affordable. In the other welfare fields, however, federal framework regulations have put 
enormous financial responsibilities – for both the actual welfare bills as well as the 
associated administrative costs – in the hands of local authorities, without providing 
adequate funding cover.  
The regional and local freedom of manoeuvre would perhaps be useful to have if 
that meant relatively wealthy areas could afford better provisions beyond the federally 
fixed minimum standards. Indeed, in some other European regions, such arguments may 
provide the rationale for greater regional and local self-determination on welfare matters 
(e.g., Scotland, Basque Country). In Germany, on the other hand, even the richest regions 
and local authorities find it extremely hard to fund the federally required welfare 
expenses. These expense structures were imposed federally at a time when the FRG 
needed credibility as a welfare state, and when they seemed affordable as the economy 
was booming. However, since 1970s these structures have led to a now chronic funding 
crisis, becoming even worse by the rising long-term welfare costs following German 
unification. As a result of this, the newly emerging claims by some of the Länder for 
greater regional self-determination cannot avoid sinister connotations of de-
solidarization: shedding joint responsibilities for welfare problems experienced elsewhere 
within the FRG, or even an intention to ‘race to the bottom’ directly.    
What then, would be the best ways forward? At first glance, virtually all attacks 
on the well-entrenched German welfare system exhale a whiff of political suicide. First, 
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the two classic approaches: leave the system basically unchanged but lower the levels of 
payment and/or raise contributions to insurance-based schemes. Both strategies have 
been employed in an incremental way over the years as and when it seemed necessary, 
but as Bulmahn (1998) has demonstrated, they are no longer working effectively. Rising 
general living expenses, more expensive healthcare treatment and drugs, longer life 
expectancies and mass unemployment have offset any gains from previous hesitative 
reform steps since the 1980s. Using far sharper drops in entitlements is likely to result in 
massive political protest – not a scenario the current government with its wafer-thin 
majority was looking forward to, but had to engage in nevertheless following the Rürup 
Commission’s recommendations. Steep increases in contributions, on the other hand, 
would not only result in similar protests by the voters but also in even less readiness for 
investors to choose Germany as a location – they are already correctly pointing out that 
the German Lohnnebenkosten (non-wage labour costs, of which employer contributions 
to social security schemes form a significant part) are higher than anywhere in the EU. 
Apparently, these appeals by the BDI and other industrial organisations have been 
successful – neither the Hartz Commission nor the Rürup Commission went down that 
route, and therefore neither did the federal government in its Agenda 2010.  
Secondly, altering the general taxation structure. This seems to be the flavour of 
the year for the Schröder government. After the 2002 elections, it has embarked on a 
policy – kept more or less secret during the election campaign –  of tax rises to fund 
social ambitions. Unveiling such an approach within weeks of an election barely won has 
already created a volatile political climate, resulting in two massive regional election 
defeats for the SPD in Lower Saxony and Hesse in early 2003, plus, not surprisingly,  
further marginalization in Bavaria in the September 2003 elections. The government 
argues that the seemingly harsh financial policies are all part of a longer-term strategy not 
only to cover on-going commitments but also to redistribute tax burdens further down the 
line with forthcoming socially and economically desirable tax relief measures.32 The key 
idea here is to use the funds raised to jump-start the employment market, as envisaged by 
                                                 
32 Some of these tax relief measures, originally scheduled to start in 2003, have been postponed to cover the 
unexpected expenses resulting from the large-scale floods engulfing many parts of Eastern Germany and 
Bavaria in the autumn of 2002.    
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the Hartz Commission. It remains to be seen whether Schröder will be more successful in 
this area than the Kohl government was.33     
Thirdly, privatisation and liberalisation. Even in the current reformist mood, 
hardly anybody in Germany dares to speak openly about privatisation steps in welfare 
matters, preferring the phrase plurale Vorsorge, i.e. social needs should be covered in a 
variety of ways, including state, private and voluntary sector involvement. In a narrower 
sense, the term is in particular used to characterise new pension schemes. Acknowledging 
that state pensions will not be enough to cover living expenses in the decades to come (an 
end to the hallowed ‘generation contract’), the government has recently promoted private 
pension insurance schemes, run by private sector insurers, where the state will top up 
individuals’ contributions. Participation in these schemes is voluntary so far. However, 
all members of the German workforce now receive an annual review of their state 
pension entitlements accumulated to date, and the often quite low sums mentioned in 
these statements has fuelled widespread unease among the population, which – as the 
government hopes – may well boost take-up rates for the new top-up schemes. Another 
field where deregulation has taken place is sickness insurance, which was traditionally 
managed by the private sector already, but completely overburdened with regulatory red 
tape. In theory, employees can now shop around for low contribution payments and 
choose from varied scopes of coverage. In practice, still few schemes deviate much from 
federally defined minimum standards, and premiums hardly vary by more than 3%. 
Nevertheless, further fields may lend themselves to similar approaches, but so far 
the government is determined not to alter the key defining characteristics of the social 
security system: employment triggers the requirement to join compulsory insurance 
schemes, the amounts of contributions is linked to the wage or salary earned, both 
employer and employee contribute to the costs, and resulting entitlements are federally 
regulated. The Kohl government had begun to question the link between employment and 
“membership” of the social security system – not because Kohl wanted a greater role for 
the state, but because the employer contributions put huge disincentives on employers 
thinking about creating jobs. Individualisation was seen as the answer, but the voters 
                                                 
33 Focussing on this issue, Kohl made an ill-advised pledge in 1996 that unemployment (then at 4m) should 
be halved by the next elections in 1998. On election day, unemployment was up to 4.6m, and Kohl lost to 
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rejected this idea, and in 1998 the Schröder government was quick to stop this 
approach.34 Whether this was a wise course of action remains debatable, and its current 
implementation stop does not necessarily mean the end of this line of thinking in 
Germany, as the current reform debate shows.  
However, privatisation and liberalisation cannot work in one crucial area, the 
social security benefits for the most needy; people on income support who for whatever 
reason have never been able to find work and thus were unable to build up insurance-
based entitlements. The state cannot abdicate this responsibility altogether – not even the 
US system has dared to do that in its recent spells of conservatism – and Germany is not 
about to do it, lest it would spell a complete disintegration of the much hailed 
Solidargemeinschaft, a system of mutual support in a society where those who are able to 
contribute (through taxes as well as insurance payments) are expected to do so to the 
extent necessary while those in need will not be left to their own inadequate devices. 
What is under debate – and this is similar to what Peterson found in the US case – is the 
degree of solidarity deemed acceptable by sectoral and territorial interest groups, and the 
population in general. The level of acceptance varies in line with the economic climate, 
and from region to region depending on the region’s social composition.     
The state responsibility to look after the needy has in the German federal system 
been divided between different territorial holders of responsibility, involving federal, 
regional and local authorities. Thus, welfare matters in the FRG have always had a 
significant territorial dimension. However, the sheer extent of the welfare state with its 
copious coverage has led to significant funding problems on all levels. It is not the 
functional division of responsibilities between territorial authorities as such that is the key 
problem. Neither a full regionalisation nor a full federalisation of responsibilities would 
be an answer to the now chronic cash crisis. It is therefore not surprising that a 
reallocation of responsibilities has so far not really been discussed in Germany – not least 
because this would automatically open another can of worms, a complete overhaul of the 
redistribution system of tax revenue between the territories and levels of government, 
which would renege on decades of entrenched practice of co-operative federalism. But 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schröder.   
34 A detailed analysis of these developments can be found in Rieger, 2002:3-12. 
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perhaps this is exactly what is needed at present: Politikentflechtung, starting with greater 
financial self-determination.   
However, in the present system, a further devolvement of responsibilities would 
only be sustainable from a regional and local perspective if accompanied by federal 
compensation payments, or an increase in the local/regional share of federally raised 
taxes. Further federalisation, on the other hand, ostensibly holds a certain attraction. 
Since virtually no local communities are in a position to provide a far better service than 
the federally proscribed standards, the loss of regional and local self-determination would 
not really be significant, while reducing the local and regional welfare bills would go a 
long way to consolidate local finance structures. Yet presumably if the federation takes 
on greater responsibilities it would demand financial compensation by reducing federal 
payments to the local budgets, and possibly even by demanding a share of locally raised 
taxes – hence the transfer of functions may prove to be revenue-neutral to all concerned.  
Having said that, there are two rather persuasive arguments in favour of a further 
federalisation of welfare matters. First, if the aim remains to retain a high level of 
national policy standardisation, if only to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’, this can be more 
straightforwardly achieved by federal management. The services would still be provided 
locally, but the financial responsibility and resource allocation for the actual expenses as 
well as the associated administrative costs would be managed centrally, with the aim of 
equalisation in mind. The Federal Employment Agency (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) 
already works along these lines, and while its track record is far from splendid, it has 
proved to be a suitable instrument for implementing federal employment policies, with 
further improvements to their service already being part of the Agenda 2010. The 
corresponding further undermining of the federal principle can be regarded as an 
acceptable loss. After all, welfare responsibilities are a huge problem, and – in terms of 
subsidiarity – one that cannot be solved on the level on which it arises, i.e. the local one. 
The higher level(s) should therefore be duty-bound to act.  
Secondly, the process of harmonisation and systematisation of applicable welfare 
law has already gone a long way with the recent reforms of most parts of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch. With the insurance-based schemes, federal regulation has worked very 
well so far, and opens up further possibilities of federal government steering, regardless 
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of the directions. The point however, is that federal regulation is more effective in driving 
through the undoubtedly necessary further systematic reforms. The only really large 
element of welfare legislation outside the SGB canon is the BSHG, and it is time to bring 
it in. Some smaller welfare matters could also be part of this drive, such as Housing 
Benefit, certain Childcare Allowances, and allowances for students in higher and further 
education and vocational training. The point here is that if this harmonisation is done, the 
general and procedural provisions of the SBG (SGB I, IV and X) become applicable to all 
welfare matters, clarifying the legal positions of all involved,35 and reducing the scope 
for misuse by both applicants and bureaucrats, as well as reducing the scope for different 
“semi-official” interpretations of optional clauses by regional and local authorities – 
preventing an underhand ‘race to the bottom’ without placing an undue burden on 
regional and local authorities in terms of national solidarity. Procedural transparency and 
efficiency need not be costly – indeed, may well lead to savings on system management 
in the long run – but would be able to contribute significantly to the public acceptability 
of the reform contents with its unpopular measures.    
The bottom line, nevertheless, is that regardless of how the welfare system is 
organised territorially or functionally, it needs to be adequately funded. What is required 
is a return to affordability. It is here that the German system is in the most urgent need of 
reform. The long-term future of the welfare state depends on sustainability, and how to 
achieve this is a matter for the intense political debate which is currently under way – but 
in which the territorial dimension is likely to remain a secondary issue. 
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